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BANNING ‘BOOBIES’?: A STANDARD FOR SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS TO EVALUATE PLAUSIBLY LEWD, ON-CAMPUS 
STUDENT SPEECH IN LIGHT OF B.H. EX REL. HAWK V. 
EASTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Kimbrilee M. Weber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As part of a national breast cancer awareness initiative, the Keep 
A Breast Foundation (“the Foundation”) began its “I • Boobies!” 
campaign.1  The campaign featured plastic bracelets with the “I • 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” slogan, which the Foundation marketed 
and sold nationally.2  Two middle school students at Easton Area 
Middle School, B.H. and K.M.,3 noticed the campaign’s popularity, 
purchased their own bracelets, and began to wear the bracelets at 
school.4  The two girls wore their bracelets to school during the 2010-
2011 academic year.5  Initially, teachers at Easton Area Middle School 
were unsure of how to react to the bracelets.6  As a result, the school 
debated the issue internally for some time.7  Eventually, a school 
security guard and the assistant principal told B.H. and K.M. that they 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., highest honors, 2012, 
Lehigh University.  Thank you to Professor Ronald Riccio and my fellow Law Review 
editors for their guidance during the composition of this Comment.  Thank you to my 
family and friends for their continued love and support throughout law school. 
 1  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (citing Br. of Amicus Curiae KABF at 20–21), cert. denied, No. 13-672, 2014 WL 
901854 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
 2   B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 298. 
 3  The case refers to B.H. and K.M. by their initials throughout in order to protect 
their privacy.  Courts do not employ uniform safeguards regarding the privacy of child 
parties in litigation, and use varied protections including reference to initials only or 
reference to first name only in case names.  The proper approach is a source of debate 
for courts.  See, e.g., Invitation to Comment, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE COURTS (2011), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ SPR11-11.pdf (debating a 
revision to California’s policy of using initials for child identification in juvenile court 
cases). 
 4  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 298–99 (citing App. 72, 92, 106, 442). 
 5  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 299. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. at 299. 
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would need to remove their bracelets while at school.8  The girls 
refused to do so, and as a result, each received an in-school suspension 
and was prohibited from attending an upcoming school event.9 
The case eventually reached the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, and the resulting decision, B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area 
School District, exacerbated the preexisting problem with the First 
Amendment rights of children in schools.  The Third Circuit heard 
the case en banc and ultimately decided in favor of B.H. and K.M.’s 
right to wear their bracelets at school.10  Despite the majority’s holding, 
the divisive dissents lamented the lack of an easily applicable standard 
for evaluating student speech.11  This lack of any standard continues to 
plague school districts after this decision.  The court’s interpretation 
of preexisting and ambiguous school First Amendment precedent 
adopted distinct categories for lewd and plausibly lewd student 
speech.12  The endorsement of this overly simplified approach only 
intensifies already existing issues concerning the scope of First 
Amendment rights in schools. 
B.H.’s central holding, that school districts cannot ban 
ambiguously or plausibly lewd speech that could be construed to 
reflect on a social or political issue, is the most problematic part of the 
case’s analysis.13  The holding gives school districts no standard or 
guidance to rely on when evaluating on-campus student speech, while 
simultaneously creating too many potential loopholes for 
disingenuous student speakers because of the malleability of key words 
in the standard.  If the Third Circuit insists on delineating a vague and 
malleable standard to govern plausibly lewd, student on-campus 
speech by expanding the reach of preexisting case precedents, it must 
provide school districts with more effective guidance to make decisions 
within these gray areas.  This guidance will allow officials to prevent 
and prepare for inevitable litigation that will result from the current 
standard’s terms “could be interpreted by a reasonable observer as 
lewd, vulgar, or profane” and could “plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on a political or social issue.”14 
 
 8  Id. at 300. 
 9  Id.  
 10  Id. at 298. 
 11  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 324, 338 (Hardiman, J., dissenting and Greenaway, 
J., dissenting). 
 12  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 308, 315.  The adoption of these categories was 
based on the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Bethel 
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  See discussion of Fraser infra pp. 5-6. 
 13  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 298. 
 14  Id. at 302. 
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This Comment proposes a factor-oriented framework that will 
enable school districts to evaluate on-campus student speech issues as 
they arise, while still respecting student free speech concerns and 
avoiding potential litigation.  The main benefit of the framework will 
be to provide districts with a way to define the ambiguous terms 
“political” and “social.”  Expanding on these terms will allow school 
districts to more effectively comply with school speech case precedent 
since the Third Circuit’s ruling in B.H.  Administrators will be able to 
consider speech issues against a standard that includes subjective, 
evaluative questions that take into consideration everyday concerns 
and contexts. 
Part II of this Comment outlines existing Supreme Court, on-
campus student speech jurisprudence and determines how B.H. is 
constrained by these cases.  Part III proposes a framework for Third 
Circuit school districts to evaluate on-campus student speech that is 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and that addresses the 
concerns this Comment highlights with the post-B.H. standard.  Part 
III also uses the Supreme Court-endorsed public employee and 
teacher speech standards to inform this Comment’s framework.  Part 
IV applies the proposed standard to two case studies to demonstrate its 
utility.  Part V concludes this Comment by reiterating the need for 
clarification of the Third Circuit’s plausibly lewd speech standard in 
order for such a standard to have any practical applicability in school 
districts.  The best way to achieve this outcome is through the adoption 
of a factor-oriented approach for administrators to use when making 
these difficult decisions. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS FOR ON-CAMPUS SCHOOL SPEECH 
A. Rationale for Free Speech Considerations in Schools 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
Supreme Court underscored the importance of First Amendment 
rights of schoolchildren for the first time.15  The Court concluded that 
a child does not check his or her constitutional rights at the door of 
the schoolhouse.16  Today, it is increasingly difficult for schools to 
uphold the broad First Amendment rights that Tinker carved out for 
students, especially in light of school safety concerns and evolving 
modes of speech.  School speech issues are complicated by a myriad of 
variables: the topic of the speech, the forum where the speech is 
 
 15  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 16  Id. 
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communicated, and the sensitivity of the audience to whom the speech 
is directed, to name a few.  One particularly problematic subset of 
these issues is deciding what amount of controversial and offensive 
speech is actually appropriate on campus. 
B. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) 
On December 16 and 17, 1965, junior high and high school 
students in Des Moines, Iowa received suspensions for wearing black 
armbands in support of a truce in the Vietnam War.17  The students 
filed a complaint through their parents, asking for an injunction that 
would allow them to wear their armbands without the fear of 
discipline.18  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the 
case.19  When ruling in favor of the children’s right to wear the 
armbands, the Court noted that the communication students have with 
one another is both inevitable and desirable in a school setting.20  As a 
part of its decision, the Court held that the school could not ban the 
armband speech because it neither created the potential for a 
substantial disruption, nor created the risk of interfering with any of 
the school’s activities.21  Under Tinker, a school has a heavy burden to 
carry in demonstrating that a student’s speech would create a 
substantial disruption in order to justify any ban on such speech.22 
The importance of Tinker in shaping the foundation of a student’s 
First Amendment rights cannot be overstated.  The case demonstrates 
the importance of student First Amendment rights, even though the 
speakers are children and even though the speech occurs in a 
classroom setting.  As the Tinker Court aptly pointed out, children, 
even while in school, are still “persons” under our Constitution.23  It is 
important to keep this framework and emphasis on the protection of 
rights in mind as student First Amendment jurisprudence continues to 
evolve over time. 
 
 
 17  Id. at 504. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 505. 
 20  See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512, 514; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) 
(arguing that speech protections in schools are essential for the exchange of ideas in 
the classroom).   
 21  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. at 511. 
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C. Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser (1986) 
Eventually, the Supreme Court narrowed the broad speech right 
it outlined in Tinker by finding “constitutionally valid reasons” to carve 
out limitations.24  One such limitation came before the Court less than 
twenty years later.  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme 
Court tempered the Tinker holding by creating an exception to the 
broad grant of First Amendment rights in schools, thereby justifying a 
school’s intervention and suppression of student First Amendment 
rights, in specific instances of lewd speech.25  Matthew Fraser was a 
student at Bethel High School in Washington when he delivered a 
nomination speech for another student’s school election campaign.26  
He gave his speech as a part of his school’s student assembly.27  During 
the speech, Fraser made sexually explicit innuendos, including “he’s 
firm in his pants . . . his character is firm,” “a man who takes his point 
and pounds it in,” and “a man who will go to the very end—even the 
climax, for each and every one of you.”28  As a result of Fraser’s 
controversial speech, some students felt embarrassed, some students 
made inappropriate sexual gestures, and one teacher decided to have 
a special discussion of the speech with her class the next day.29  The 
school notified Fraser that he was going to be suspended for three days 
following his speech and that he lost the opportunity to speak at 
graduation;30 as a result of these disciplinary actions, Fraser brought an 
action seeking damages and injunctive relief.31 
The school district’s ability to suspend Fraser outweighed Fraser’s 
First Amendment right to make his speech.32  The Court evaluated the 
“interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive 
spoken language” in arriving at a decision.33  Relying in part on the 
consideration of obscene speech in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,34 the 
Court distinguished Fraser’s speech, undeserving of First Amendment 
protection, from Tinker’s armband, which was deserving of 
protection.35  The Court found that Fraser’s speech warranted unique 
 
 24  Id. 
 25  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. 
 26  Id. at 677. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 29  Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
 30  Id. at 678. 
 31  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679. 
 32  Id. at 685. 
 33  Id. at 684. 
 34  Id. at 684–85. 
 35  Id. at 685. 
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consideration because it was lewd speech, different from the politically 
controversial speech at issue in Tinker.36  The Court distinguished its 
holding from Tinker by noting that “unlike the sanctions imposed on 
the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this 
case were unrelated to any political viewpoint.”37  Even though Tinker 
provided broad First Amendment rights for schoolchildren in a school 
setting, since Fraser, school districts are within their rights to stop lewd 
speech that could undermine a school’s mission.38 
In addition to limiting Tinker’s expansive allowance of student 
speech rights in the context of lewd speech,39 the Fraser Court 
enunciated a balancing test that highlights the competing interests at 
play in deciding whether to allow or to ban a student’s questionable 
speech.40  The Fraser test weighs “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate 
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms” against 
“society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries 
of socially appropriate behavior.”41  Fraser is significant because it limits 
Tinker’s broad rule of permissibility and gives more power to school 
districts to ban or prevent student First Amendment speech that is 
classified as lewd.  Unfortunately, this seemingly clear exemption did 
not end or even simplify school districts’ inquiries into student speech 
issues because determining what modes and content of speech qualify 
as lewd or vulgar can be incredibly difficult.42 
D. Morse v. Frederick (2007)43 
Since Fraser, the Court has continued to grapple with where to 
draw the line in limiting student speech, while simultaneously striving 
to maintain the integrity of student First Amendment rights.  About 
 
 36  Id. at 680, 683. 
 37  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 38  Id. 
 39  This statement bears in mind the limitation for the cause of, or potential for, a 
substantial disruption that the Tinker Court endorsed. 
 40  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Many courts have grappled with defining these amorphous terms.  See, e.g., Pyle 
By and Through Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 
1994) (“People will always differ on the level of crudity required before a school 
administrator should react.  The T-Shirts in question here may strike people variously 
as humorous, innocuous, stupid or indecent.”) (emphasis in original). 
 43  In addition to Tinker, Fraser, and Morse, the Court also decided Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the fourth and final seminal student speech 
case.  A background of Kuhlmeier is omitted from this Comment because the B.H. court 
did not focus on Kuhlmeier in its analysis, and this Comment does not base any of its 
proposed framework on Kuhlmeier. 
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twenty years after Fraser, the Court created an additional limitation on 
student First Amendment rights in Morse v. Frederick.44  During a school-
sanctioned and supervised event celebrating the Olympic Torch Relay, 
a group of students at Juneau-Douglas High School in Alaska displayed 
a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”45  The students exhibited 
the banner while watching the event take place across the street from 
the school.46  Joseph Frederick received a suspension for being the only 
student to refuse to comply with the demands of school officials to 
remove the banner display from the event.47 
The Court found that the school was justified in suspending Mr. 
Frederick, because his banner could reasonably be interpreted as the 
school’s toleration of illegal drug use in contravention of school policy 
if left displayed during the Olympic Torch Relay.48  The Court noted 
that Frederick did not claim that his speech conveyed any political 
message;49 the speech merely advocated drug use.50  The lack of any 
political message, paired with the fact that this message could have 
been attributed to the school itself as an endorsement of illegal drug 
use, justified the ban and the resulting discipline.51 
The Morse case is significant, even though it concerns illegal drug 
use and not lewd speech, because both the majority and Judge 
Hardiman’s dissent in B.H. rely heavily on the Morse Court’s analysis in 
their opinions.  Morse foreshadowed some of the ultimately crucial 
considerations to the majority’s opinion in B.H., by noting that “the 
government may likewise restrict speech that ‘a reasonable observer 
would interpret as advocating illegal drug use’ and that cannot 
‘plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social 
 
 44  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 45  Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a). 
 46  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 47  Id. at 398. 
 48  Id. at 403, 408–09. 
 49  Id. at 403. 
 50  The B.H. holding now puts Third Circuit school districts in analogous situations 
in a much more precarious position when evaluating this exact same banner in the 
event that another “Frederick” attempted to argue that his speech did connote a 
political message.  Making this argument, even if dishonestly, would not be a difficult 
feat for a student today in light of marijuana legalization movements now afoot in the 
United States.  Should a Third Circuit school district now be forced to allow this same 
banner under B.H.?  Without any clarification of the B.H. holding, it seems the answer 
may be yes, and indeed, Justice Hardiman agrees in his B.H. dissent when noting that 
“[the majority] refused to address what the result of the [Morse] case would have been 
had Frederick’s banner been ‘political.’” B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 
725 F.3d 293, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, No. 13-672, 
2014 WL 901854 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
 51  Morse, 551 U.S. at 408–10. 
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issue.’”52  These considerations eventually form the heart of the Third 
Circuit majority’s B.H. analysis and plausibly lewd student speech test.53 
E. B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District 
School districts still struggle with managing potentially 
impermissible student speech because the line where student speech 
crosses from permissible to impermissible is far from clear, especially 
in the context of ambiguously lewd speech.  Recently, the Third Circuit 
in B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District adopted a new standard 
through which plausibly lewd speech can be evaluated.54  This case 
creates another limitation on broad student First Amendment speech 
rights.  In B.H., Easton Area School district officials reprimanded 
students B.H. and K.M. for wearing breast cancer awareness bracelets 
that read “I • boobies! (KEEP A BREAST).”55  The “I • boobies! (KEEP 
A BREAST)” bracelets had created a stir at school districts all over the 
nation; the debate was not unique to the Easton Area School District.56 
In B.H., B.H. and K.M. had been wearing the bracelets to school 
since the beginning of the 2010–2011 year.57  In September of that year, 
several teachers asked the assistant principal of the eighth grade if they 
should force the girls to take off their bracelets.58  The bracelets had 
not caused any disruptions or prompted any problematic comments,59 
yet the school’s leadership ultimately concluded that students wearing 
bracelets with the word “boobies” on them would be asked to remove 
 
 52  Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 53  See infra p. 10. 
 54  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 302. 
 55  Id. at 300. 
 56  See, e.g., Don Carrigan, School Changes Policy on Controversial Bracelets, WCSH6 
PORTLAND (Sept. 23, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.wcsh6.com/news/article/ 
173767/School-changes-policy-on-bracelets (noting that high school officials in 
Waldoboro, Maine initially had a dress code policy banning the bracelets, but 
subsequently revised the policy to allow the bracelets), and Ken Christian, Breast Cancer 
Fundraising Bracelets Banned from South Dakota High School, WCSH6 PORTLAND (Sept. 2, 
2010, 11:33 AM), http://www.wcsh6.com/news/article/126283/0/portland.high 
schoolsports.net (noting that, while some school districts have allowed high school 
students to wear the breast cancer bracelets inside out, Baltic High School in Baltic, 
South Dakota has chosen to ban the bracelets completely). 
 57  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 299. 
 58  Id. 
 59  This was a significant factual departure from the Supreme Court’s observation 
in Fraser, where Fraser’s speech prompted bewilderment, incited inappropriate sexual 
gestures, and caused at least one teacher to address the speech with her class.  See supra 
note 29 and accompanying text.  Here, there were only de minimus and speculative 
reactions to the bracelets in the middle school.   
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their bracelets while in school.60  Administrators feared that the 
bracelets might reappear during the school’s upcoming breast cancer 
awareness month observance, and they publically announced the ban 
on the bracelets on October 27, 2010, the day before the observance.61 
B.H. wore her “I • boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelet on the 
day administrators announced the ban; additionally, both B.H. and 
K.M. wore their bracelets the following day in honor of the school’s 
breast cancer awareness month.62  After refusing to remove their 
bracelets, the school suspended both girls and banned them from 
attending the school’s Winter Ball.63  B.H. and K.M., through their 
parents, sued Easton Area School District.64 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the District Court enjoined the bracelet ban.65  
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that students wearing the “I • 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets could not be restricted by the 
school district.66  The court in B.H. created another exception to the 
already existing lewd speech exception from Fraser by holding that “a 
school may also categorically restrict speech that—although not plainly 
lewd, vulgar, or profane—could be interpreted by a reasonable 
observer as lewd, vulgar, or profane so long as it could not also 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a political or social issue.”67  
Fraser’s holding only focused on plainly lewd speech, whereas here, the 
Third Circuit’s holding extended to plausibly lewd speech.68 
1. Obscenity Should Not Automatically Equal Per Se 
Lewdness 
The Third Circuit overemphasized the references to FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation and obscene speech from Fraser in connecting 
“plainly lewd speech” and “obscenity to minors,” and this reliance has 
created further problems with respect to the new gray area that the 
plausibly lewd student speech issue created in B.H.69  The Third Circuit 
reasoned that the Fraser speech was per se lewd because it was obscene 
 
 60  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 299. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. at 299–300. 
 63  Id. at 300. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 301. 
 66  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 320. 
 67  Id. at 302. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 316.   
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under the Pacifica standard.70  The court explained that these “patently 
offensive reference[s] to sexual organs” are “obscene to minors . . . 
[because they] offend for the same reasons obscenity offends.”71  In 
holding that obscene speech such as George Carlin’s seven dirty 
words72 is patently offensive, the Third Circuit endorsed a per se 
lewdness-obscenity exception that overlaps with the gray area of 
plausibility that the court has created in its plausible lewdness 
exception. 
This categorical exception for per se lewdness is too broad and 
allows a school district to entirely ban speech that, in some instances, 
could conceivably fall within the majority-endorsed plausibly lewd gray 
area.73  In creating this exception, the majority has endorsed an 
exception to its own plausibility standard that is confusing and 
unworkable because the plausible lewdness standard itself is far too 
ambiguous.74  If a school district can categorically ban certain words 
because they are obscene to minors, even though they are arguably 
plausibly lewd and would meet the Third Circuit’s test warranting 
allowance of the speech, the same speech could simultaneously meet 
and not meet the Third Circuit’s current test for admissibility.  To 
achieve this confusing outcome, a speaker need only demonstrate that 
an obscene word, which could be plausibly construed as lewd, 
comments on a political or social issue.  In this situation, no clear 
standard would govern.  This contradictory result certainly cannot be 
what the Third Circuit intended. 
Instead, to remain consistent with its plausibly lewd political or 
social commentary exception,75 the Third Circuit should adopt a 
presumption of lewdness for patently offensive and obscene speech such 
as George Carlin’s seven dirty words.  In cases where the speech at issue 
 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 318 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 72  See George Carlin: 7 Dirty Words You Can’t Say On Television, YOUTUBE (Aug. 12, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8dCIKqkIg1w. 
 73  See, e.g., B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 318 (discussing the school district’s “I • 
tits (KEEP A BREAST)” hypothetical).  An argument could be made that this speech 
is plausibly lewd and not patently lewd based on the evolution of the meaning and 
colloquial use of the word “tits” over time.  In endorsing a blanket ban on patently 
obscene speech under Fraser’s lewd speech standard, the Third Circuit majority has 
impermissibly restricted the First Amendment rights of schoolchildren.   
 74  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Easton Area Sch. Dist v. B.H. ex rel. 
Hawk, No. 13-672 (petition for cert. filed Dec. 3, 2013), 2013 WL 6327646, at *15 
(arguing that “[t]he Third Circuit’s unsupported distinction between what is ‘patently’ 
lewd and what is ‘ambiguously’ lewd creates an unworkable metaphysical dichotomy 
of meaning, which nevertheless remains ‘lewd’”). 
 75  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 302. 
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is patently offensive, and therefore presumptively lewd, the speaker will 
still have an opportunity to rebut the presumption of lewdness through 
use of this Comment’s proposed standard.  The speaker would then be 
able to argue that the speech is only plausibly lewd and can be seen as 
commenting on a political or social issue.  If the speaker can rebut the 
presumption of obscenity and demonstrate that his speech meets the 
framework proposed in this Comment, the school district is not 
allowed to ban the speech, even if it is otherwise obscene.  This 
consideration is truer to the ideals of First Amendment rights in 
schools and avoids contradictory and overlapping tests in the Third 
Circuit, while also prioritizing the interest in preventing the exposure 
of minors to obscene speech that the Third Circuit valued in its 
decision.76 
2. B.H.’s Gray Area of Plausible Lewdness 
In B.H., the Third Circuit majority found that the case uniquely 
warranted an exception to Fraser because the bracelets at issue were 
not as patently lewd as Fraser’s speech;77 instead, the bracelets fell into 
a gray area of plausible lewdness and qualified as speech that a 
reasonable observer may or may not find lewd.78 
In addition to creating an exception to Fraser, the Third Circuit 
majority’s reading of the plausibility realm of lewd speech relied 
heavily on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse to create its second 
limitation.79  Alito’s concurrence in the majority’s decision in Morse was 
expressly conditioned on an understanding that speech that could 
plausibly be construed as social or political commentary would not be 
encompassed in Morse’s endorsement of the constitutional ban on 
speech promoting illegal drug use.80  Similarly, the B.H. majority 
 
 76  Id. at 306 (noting the interest in limiting exposure of obscenity to minors). 
 77  Id. 
 78  But see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 74, at *19 (arguing that 
Matthew Fraser’s speech would now fall into the plausibly lewd gray area under the 
Third Circuit’s adopted approach because it was plausibly political, thereby shielding 
Fraser from his school district’s regulation, an undesirable outcome.  The petition 
further argues that the Third Circuit B.H. opinion and Fraser leave open the issue of 
whether “plausibly political” speech can also be protected.). 
 79  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 308–14. 
 80  Id. at 309–10 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., 
concurring)).  The B.H. majority’s reading of Justice Alito’s Morse concurrence is an 
application of the narrowest rationale principle.  The Third Circuit uses this principle 
to read Justice Alito’s Morse concurrence as a limitation on the majority’s holding in 
Morse, and also finds Justice Alito’s concurrence to be binding in its majority opinion.  
This principle is highly controversial in its accepted breadth and application.  Because 
this Comment’s focus is a proposal for a clarified framework based on the majority’s 
holding (a holding that has applied the narrowest rationale in a specific way to arrive 
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engrafted this consideration of plausible political or social speech from 
Morse as an additional safeguard protecting plausibly lewd student 
speech in the B.H. holding.81 
The lack of clarity that B.H. provides to school districts is 
underscored by the disagreement between the Third Circuit judges.82  
The entire Third Circuit heard the case,83 and it produced two 
dissents.84  Judge Hardiman’s dissent argued that the court 
inappropriately combined the Fraser and Morse tests into a hybrid test 
in a case that had nothing to do with illegal use of drugs.85  Judge 
Hardiman pointed out that “although the appellate courts have had 
dozens of opportunities to do so, no court has suggested that Morse 
qualifie[s] Fraser in any way.”86  To reflect the intent behind them, the 
exceptions should be treated as “independent analytical constructs 
that permit schools to regulate certain types of speech that would 
otherwise be protected under Tinker.”87  The ambiguity of the hybrid 
test that the majority adopted has created practical problems with 
respect to actually carrying out this test in practice.88 
Judge Greenaway echoed the concerns of Judge Hardiman by 
noting the troublesome position school districts are left in by the 
majority’s decision.89  He noted that “the unabashed invocation of a 
lewd, vulgar, indecent or plainly offensive term is not what is at issue 
here; what is at issue is the notion that we have established a test which 
effectively has no parameters.”90  Judge Greenaway’s critique of the 
majority’s decision provides a springboard for the continued need for 
a workable standard, even more so after B.H.’s issuance.91  He asked: 
“[h]ow is a school district now better able to discern when it may 
 
at a certain conclusion), the Author accepts the majority’s reading of Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Morse and does not debate the B.H. majority’s application of the 
narrowest rationale principle. 
 81  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 309–15. 
 82  See id. at 324, 338 (Hardiman, J., dissenting and Greenaway, J., dissenting).  
 83  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 297. 
 84  Id. at 338. 
 85  Id. at 330–31 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 86  Id. at 331. 
 87  Id. at 331. 
 88  Id. at 333. 
 89  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 338–39 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) 
 90  Id. at 340.  
 91  This continued need for a workable standard post-B.H. has prompted the 
Easton Area School District to vote in favor of petitioning the Supreme Court for 
certiorari.  See ‘Boobies’ bracelet fight heads to Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2013, 
11:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/29/boobies-
bracelet-supreme-court/3310843/. 
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exercise its discretion to impede the use of a particular slogan, as it 
relates to an awareness program, than before the issuance of this 
opinion?”92  The short answer to Judge Greenaway’s question is that it 
is not.  After B.H., Third Circuit school districts are in perhaps their 
worst position to date; they are caught in an era filled with 
revolutionary technology with evolving and rapidly multiplying forms 
of speech while armed with a most ambiguous and malleable test to 
evaluate that speech. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR THIRD CIRCUIT SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO 
EVALUATE ON-CAMPUS STUDENT 
SPEECH THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH FRASER AND B.H. 
A. The Relevancy of Resolving This Issue 
Many comments address the problems that Fraser created and left 
unsettled, as well as the general ambiguity and inapplicability of all of 
the student free speech tests when considered holistically.93  Yet the 
division between the Third Circuit judges in B.H. and the lack of any 
guidelines for applying the new standard demonstrate that this issue is 
far from settled and remains divisive, even to esteemed judges.94  
School districts desperately need additional clarity in order to carry out 
policies that are consistent with both the Supreme Court’s test and the 
Third Circuit’s newly articulated B.H. plausibility test. 
The standard needs additional elaboration in order to have any 
applicability or longevity in school districts today.  Any successful 
proposal must take some of the broad, sweeping terms and attempt to 
define them or provide examples, or at a minimum establish 
guideposts for school districts to look to when analyzing speech 
concerns.  Even if these proposed solutions do not completely 
eliminate all ambiguity, this will create a standard that school district 
administrators can rely on to make an immediate decision when a 
student speech issue arises. 
The standard must also close loopholes so a student cannot easily 
work around the language of the standard by making a weak argument 
that his or her speech comments on a political or social issue.95  Judge 
 
 92  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 339 (Greenaway, J., dissenting). 
 93  See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Mixed Messages, Muddled Meanings, Drunk Dicks, and Boobies 
Bracelets: Sexually Suggestive Student Speech and the Need to Overrule or Radically Refashion 
Fraser, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (2012). 
 94  See supra note 84. 
 95  The concern for additional students’ testing the limits of this standard is most 
effectively demonstrated through considering examples that a school district would 
have no authority to ban under the Third Circuit’s articulated standard.  See Brief of 
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Hardiman echoed this malleability concern in his dissent when he 
noted that “the Majority’s approach vindicates any speech cloaked in a 
political or social message even if a reasonable observer could deem it 
lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly offensive.”96  Judge Hardiman 
illustrated his concern through the use of a hypothetical, whereby 
Matthew Fraser’s plausibly lewd speech could be protected if his 
classmate’s name were substituted with the name of a candidate for 
president because such speech could then plausibly be seen as 
commenting on a political or social issue.97 
Another example of this problem can be demonstrated by 
imagining an explicit T-shirt featuring two women engaging in sexual 
acts with one another.  Under the current standard, a plaintiff could 
have a viable argument that this T-shirt should be protected as social 
speech because it concerns potentially both women’s sexual liberation, 
as well as the rights of same-sex couples, both indisputably important 
social and political issues.98  The current malleability of the terms 
“political” and “social,” when used in the context that the majority has 
endorsed, would open the floodgates to many arguments similar to 
these hypothetical scenarios, and because of the lack of guidance for 
evaluating these factors, many of these scenarios would need to be 
permitted as protected speech by a school district.  This sort of 
manipulation would create the risk of an easily abused standard that 
would soon be completely eroded to no standard at all. 
The framework must also provide for an updated understanding 
of Fraser to account for evolving modes of speech and communication 
in order to remain relevant.  This requires that the standard be flexible 
enough to anticipate the continually evolving technology, tastes, and 
stylistic preferences of schoolchildren; a standard that is too rigid will 
quickly become obsolete in an age of continually changing technology 
and trends.  The standard must especially consider symbolic speech, 
such as the breast cancer awareness bracelets at issue in B.H., because 
 
Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Easton Area Sch. 
Dist v. B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d 293 (2014) No. 13-672 (filed Jan. 6, 2014), 2014 WL 
69412, at *14–*15 and n. 26 (noting that examples such as “Illegals Suck,” “Feel My 
Balls,” “I want YOU to speak English,” “Axe me about Ebonics,” “Fighting for peace is 
like screwing for virginity,” and “Let’s Play Army (Army Insignia) I’ll lie down and you 
can blow the hell out of me” would all be plausibly lewd commentary on a political 
issue that a school district could not prevent without additional clarification of the 
Third Circuit’s standard). 
 96  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 334 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).  
 97  Id.  
 98  See also the discussion supra at Part II.E.1 regarding the overlap between some 
obscene and per se lewd words and plausibly lewd speech that comments on a political 
or social issue. 
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clothing, jewelry, portable electronics, and technology such as iPhone 
applications are popular modes of expression that are increasingly 
targeted at school-aged children.99 
Indeed, one such example of an entity’s aggressively marketing to 
children and young adults is the Keep A Breast Foundation from B.H.  
The Foundation sponsors the Keep A Breast Traveling Education 
Booth (“the Booth”), which is specifically targeted at “bring[ing the 
Foundation’s] message of breast cancer awareness and prevention 
directly to young people at the events they attend.”100  The Booth 
attends events such as action sports events and the Vans Warped Tour 
in an effort to get its message to the targeted recipients,101 who attend 
these events in large numbers.102  The Foundation aims to do this in 
order to “encourage[ ] young people to participate and learn in 
environments where they are already comfortable.”103  This goal is 
analogous to the Foundation’s “I • boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” 
initiative, where it has chosen to market a message in a medium it 
thinks will be appealing to young people as well,104 with the goal of 
starting conversations about the topic of breast cancer awareness.105 
 
 99  See, e.g., Bruce Horovitz, Marketing to kids gets more savvy with new technologies, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/ 
industries/retail/2011-07-27-new-technolgies-for-marketing-to-kids_n.htm (noting 
that marketing, especially through technology, is increasingly directed toward young 
children, and pointing out that children can develop brand loyalties at as young as two 
years old). 
 100  Traveling Education Booth, THE KEEP A BREAST FOUND., www.keep-a-
breast.org/programs/traveling-education-booth/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Teens attend the Vans Warped Tour in such high numbers that the event has 
created a “reverse daycare” for parents escorting teens to the concert to rest and watch 
movies, relax, and enjoy beverages while their children attend the Warped Tour.  See 
Brian Kraus, Vans Warped Tour 2013 expand “Best Day Ever” and “Reverse Daycare” parent 
programs to all dates, ALT. PRESS (June 19, 2013), http://www.altpress.com/news/entry/ 
vans_warped_tour_2013_expand_best_day_ever_and_reverse_daycare_parent_progr.  
 103  Traveling Education Booth, supra note 100. 
 104  I LOVE BOOBIES!, THE KEEP A BREAST FOUND., http://www.keep-a-
breast.org/programs/i-love-boobies/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 105  The Keep A Breast Foundation is a “leading youth focused global breast cancer 
organization” according to the Foundation’s amicus curiae brief.  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. 
Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-672, 2014 
WL 901854 (Mar. 10, 2014).  The organization co-brands products with the goal of 
raising awareness, and it tries to create products that are specifically attractive and 
appealing to young people.  Id.  The campaign created its bracelets in assorted bright 
colors, and these bracelets quickly became a big hit with young people, especially 
preteens and teens. Id. at 298–99.  The bracelets aim to “remove the shame associated 
with breasts and breast health,” and the Foundation says that “the program resonates 
with young people, and encourages them to be open and active about breast cancer 
prevention.” See I LOVE BOOBIES!, supra note 104.  A proposed framework must 
account for continually evolving marketing strategies in items like the Keep A Breast 
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B. The Benefits of a Factors Test 
A framework with an enumerated factor system for a school 
district’s evaluations is the most effective way to achieve the 
overarching goals of added clarity and ease of applicability.106  A factors 
system presented as guideposts, rather than as a rigid test, will provide 
the fluidity necessary for varying modes of speech during changing 
times.  A guidepost system also implicitly acknowledges that every 
factor within the standard will not necessarily apply to each type of 
potential speech issue that the framework will evaluate. 
A factors system also frames the school district official’s analysis 
when evaluating speech by posing the questions and considerations 
that the official should be engaging with throughout his or her 
analysis.  This creates a streamlined and more consistent mode of 
evaluation for all officials in all districts, which although susceptible to 
an individual official’s subjective analysis,107 provides fenced-in 
parameters for these subjective evaluations.  It avoids the risks of 
officials merely making subjective decisions, justified in post hoc 
rationalizations, based on the facial offensiveness of a student’s 
proffered speech.  Creating a factors system that provides ways, 
through rhetorical questions, to define “political” and “social” is an 
attempt to give some concreteness to the plausibility standard, by 
forcing administrators to engage in active analysis and articulate 
reasons for banning or allowing questionable speech, and to improve 
the Third Circuit’s approach.  This proposal will eliminate the most 
significant problems with the applicability of the Third Circuit’s 
current post-B.H. standard.  These adoptions will provide concrete 
considerations that will help define the abstract terms the standard 
relies too heavily upon, and then give these terms practical meaning. 
C. Consideration of the Supreme Court’s Guidance in Similar Realms 
When modeling a proposed standard for school districts to 
evaluate plausibly lewd student speech, it is helpful to consider the 
legal framework that the Supreme Court has used in creating its 
standard for public employee speech, especially with respect to 
 
Foundation’s “I • boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets because items like the 
bracelets are going to be increasingly targeted towards children and marketers will 
continue to strive to come up with new and inventive ways to reach this age group. 
 106  The factors test will be used as a guidepost for analysis, rather than a rigid test. 
 107  Some administrative officials will subjectively apply the test more strictly or 
loosely than others; this is unavoidable unless one panel of administrative officials 
makes the determinations for all schools in the Third Circuit.  Because this ideal is not 
feasible, having all officials use the same framework decreases the risk of subjective 
biases being incorporated into each analysis. 
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teachers in schools.108  This Comment’s proposal can benefit from the 
consideration of the public employee standard, which the Supreme 
Court has already endorsed.109  The two most important cases when 
considering the public employee framework, for the purpose of 
creating a guidepost factors test for school districts to evaluate 
plausibly lewd student speech, are Pickering v. Board of Education110 and 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.111 
1. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High 
School District 205, Will County, Illinois 
In Pickering, a teacher was fired for writing a letter to a local 
newspaper that was critical of the way that the Board of Education and 
school officials had handled past attempts to raise school revenue.112  
The Court held in favor of Pickering while declaring that “absent proof 
of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by [the speaker], a 
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance 
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”113  
Pickering also enumerated a balancing test whereby a court should 
balance the interests of the speaker-citizen against the interests of the 
state-employer in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”114  More generally, the Court also 
considered whether Pickering’s statements impeded his performance 
of daily classroom duties or inappropriately interfered with the 
operation of the school.115  Pickering’s standard provides a valuable 
overarching question that can inform this Comment’s proposed 
guidepost factors system: were the expressions of the speaker, as a 
citizen, about issues of public concern or importance?116 
 
 
 108  Teacher speech is admittedly different than student speech; teachers can be 
government speakers in a public school setting and teachers have influence over their 
students.  Similarities between the two situations, however, make consideration of 
teacher speech a benefit to this proposal. 
 109  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006). 
 110  Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
 111  Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410. 
 112  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.   
 113  Id. at 574. 
 114  Id. at 568. 
 115  Id. at 572–73. 
 116  Id. at 574. 
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2. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
In Garcetti, the Court found against a deputy district attorney for 
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office by holding that 
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”117  The Court further 
noted that “a government entity has broader discretion to restrict 
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it 
imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect 
the entity’s operations.”118  The question “does speech have the 
potential to affect the school’s operations,”119 which is similar to 
Tinker’s substantial disruption test,120 is another rhetorical question 
that can help inform this Comment’s proposed guidepost factors test. 
Garcetti focused on whether the District Attorney’s speech had any 
potential to affect the office’s operations.  This consideration is 
applicable to this Comment’s proposal because if there is a risk that 
speech is going to affect the function of the school, the speech, even if 
plausibly lewd, should not be allowed, even if it comments on a 
political or social issue.  School systems in our society would not be 
able to function uninterrupted without this necessary limitation.  This 
consideration is relevant before one even arrives at the consideration 
of whether the speech at issue can be deemed political or social for 
purposes of meeting the standard.121  Even though this consideration 
is akin to the Tinker “substantial disruption” test, it goes further and 
requires an actual effect on the school’s operations.122  The standards 
the Court articulated in Pickering and reiterated and relied on, in part, 
in Garcetti are helpful because they articulate the questions that the 
Court has found valuable when evaluating questionably permissible 





 117  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413, 421 (2006). 
 118  Id. at 418. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 121  If the answer to this question is no, the analysis ends and the school district can 
justifiably prevent the student’s speech.  See further elaboration in guidepost factors 
test, infra Part III.D. 
 122  Tinker, by contrast, also allowed the banning of speech that school officials had 
“reason to anticipate” would create a substantial disruption.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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D. Proposed Guidepost Framework for Evaluating Plausibly Lewd Speech 
that PlausiblyComments on a Political or Social Issue 
When evaluating speech under the Third Circuit’s B.H. holding, 
school district officials must first ask the necessary threshold questions 
to determine whether the speech qualifies as plausibly lewd, requiring 
an entrance into B.H.’s gray area where speech may either be 
categorically banned as lewd or be completely permissible since it 
poses no First Amendment problem.  Once the overarching 
determination is made and the speech is deemed to be plausibly lewd, 
the factors shape the questions that school district officials should ask 
while evaluating the plausibly lewd speech and determining whether 
the speech can be considered “political” or “social” such that it cannot 
be restricted under B.H.  The difficult part is determining what 
“political” or “social” means in the context of plausibly lewd student 
speech.123 
1. The Plausibility Inquiry 
The first step is determining whether the proffered speech is 
plausibly lewd.  Another way of phrasing this determination is to ask if 
a reasonable person could potentially consider the speech to be 
lewd.124  The plausibility inquiry should be based on the expectations 
of a reasonable person, because those who are more or less sensitive in 
society are going to react more drastically than the average person.  
Making a showing of plausibility is a considerably low standard to meet. 
The standard should incorporate the reasonable person’s 
behavior based on community expectations.  Sensitivity concerns must 
be considered against the backdrop of the community because as 
speech and methods of communication evolve, speech that was lewd 
years ago may now be commonplace, even in schools.  This concern is 
especially relevant with younger generations.  If the speech is plainly 
lewd or if the speech could never be construed as lewd, it does not fall 
 
 123  This has only been exacerbated by the Third Circuit’s refusal to provide any 
guidance on how to make such a determination.  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. 
Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 318 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-672, 2014 WL 901854 (Mar. 
10, 2014) (“[W]e need not speculate on context-dependent hypotheticals to give 
guidance to schools and district courts.  The fault lines of our framework are 
adequately mapped out in the rest of First Amendment jurisprudence.”).  
Interestingly, the Third Circuit has relied on the clarity of First Amendment 
jurisprudence to decline providing guidance; First Amendment jurisprudence 
continues to confuse and divide courts, however, and the majority’s opinion even fuses 
the Fraser and Morse tests in a way that significantly detracts from any potential 
argument of clarity.  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 333 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 124  Consideration of what an overly sensitive or easily offended individual would 
think should not be factored into this analysis. 
WEBER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:42 AM 
666 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:647 
within the scope of the plausibility inquiry, and the school district’s 
analysis ends here.  If, however, the speech is determined to be 
plausibly lewd, the school district official’s analysis continues on to the 
second, more complicated, portion of the analysis—the political or 
social issue determination. 
2. The Pickering/Garcetti Overarching Question 
 Once an issue is deemed plausibly lewd, the Pickering/Garcetti 
consideration,125 similar to Tinker’s substantial disruption test,126 should 
be considered in order to determine whether the analysis should 
continue to the second stage.  This inquiry requires school district 
officials to ask whether the speech has the potential to affect the 
school’s mission or operations.  This is similar to the questions posed 
in Pickering and Garcetti,127 but it is useful in this context as well.  
Teacher speech has a large effect on students because of a teacher’s 
position of authority within the school.  Similarly, this concern exists 
with respect to the power of students and student speech to affect or 
influence other students.128  Considerations involved in this 
overarching question are: how would outsiders or visitors to the school 
react to this speech?  Would the visitors have reason to believe the 
school was endorsing the speech?  Is the speech likely to have a 
negative effect on other students in the school? 
These questions, though not entirely exhaustive of the necessary 
analytical inquiries, provide guideposts for school district officials to 
begin their analysis.  These rhetorical questions, posed to the officials 
tasked with making the ultimate speech determination, ensure that the 
officials are considering the correct overarching concerns, even 
though the necessary determination is an admittedly fact-intensive and 
somewhat subjective determination.  Ensuring that all school district 
officials in the Third Circuit begin their inquiries at the same point, 
regardless of the mode of speech, is a benefit that will provide 
continuity among school district officials’ speech determinations. 
 
 125  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 126  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 127  This inquiry acknowledges that the substantial difference between Garcetti and 
this Comment’s proposal is that students are not agents of the school or public 
employees; therefore, their speech cannot be fairly attributed to the government.  
Nevertheless, this is still a helpful consideration once the proper limitations are 
applied. 
 128  See, e.g., Linda Gorman, Peer Effects in the Classroom, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/digest/apr01/w7867.html (last visited Mar. 31, 
2015) (noting that at least some peer effects in the classroom do exist and 
characteristics like race and gender variation in classrooms can affect these effects). 
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3. The Political or Social Issue Determination 
Once the overarching questions have been answered “yes” and 
“no,”129 respectively, the inquiry continues to determine whether the 
speech could “plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a political 
or social issue.”130  If the speech plausibly comments on either issue, 
the speech cannot be banned by the school district, even if plausibly 
lewd.  If, on the other hand, the speech does not comment on a 
political or social issue, the school district is justified in banning the 
speech, even if only plausibly—not patently—lewd.  Political speech 
and social speech are potentially overlapping categories; for the 
purpose of this Comment’s proposed guidepost factors test, however, 
they will be bifurcated into two distinct categories in order to 
demonstrate the somewhat different, but necessary, inquiries for both 
categories of speech. 
i. Does the Speech Provide Commentary on a Political 
Issue? 
In asking this question, school district officials should weigh the 
following factors, and no presence or absence of any one factor should 
be dispositive.  This flexibility ensures that the test is fluid enough to 
anticipate that every single question may not be applicable to every 
potential speech issue the school district may encounter, especially as 
modes of speech continue to evolve.  Simultaneously, the questions 
provide “broad strokes inquiry guideposts”; that is, the factors force 
school districts to ask overarching questions that will be applicable to 
many kinds of potential speech issues in order to guide the official’s 
analysis when evaluating speech. 
The relevant guidepost factor questions in the political issue 
determination are as follows: (1) Does the speech side with a viewpoint 
in a debate?; (2) Does the speech express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
a politician or policy?; (3) Does the speech relate to current or historical 
events of “news-worthy” significance?/Is this speech about an issue we 
could reasonably expect to see covered on a news program?; (4) To 
what degree is the speech’s value clouded by its lewdness?/How much of 
the message is focused on the lewd aspect of the speech vs. the 
 
 129  This means that the speech is such that a reasonable person, based on 
community expectations, could plausibly interpret the speech to be lewd, and the 
speech is not such that it could affect the school’s mission or be attributed to the school 
itself. 
 130  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 302 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, No. 13-672, 2014 WL 901854 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
WEBER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:42 AM 
668 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:647 
inherent political value of the speech?131 
The most important factors in this determination are the third 
and fourth.  The third factor considers the prominence of the political 
issue against the backdrop of our contemporary society.  This question 
is highly contextual and the answer of how prominent a political issue 
is could change over time; an issue that is very important at one point  
could become much less so years later.  
 An example makes the practical application of this factor easy to 
understand.  If a student is wearing an extremely controversial and 
plausibly lewd shirt that concerns a political movement that is being 
undertaken by only one or a few people halfway around the world, this 
is not likely to be something of “news-worthy” significance here in the 
United States.132  It is not something that would provide a justification 
for the plausible lewdness that it would cause within the school, and 
this factor would not weigh heavily in favor of admission of the speech.  
On the other hand, topics such as desegregation,133 mass genocide 
abroad,134 and local and national political campaigns would all be 
examples of political speech of “news-worthy” significance that would 
favor admission of the speech under the third factor and not 
automatically be overcome by any perceived lewdness in the fourth 
factor. 
The fourth factor, the degree that the speech’s value is clouded 
by its lewdness, also deserves additional explanation.  This factor 
requires that school district officials consider and compare how much 
of the entire message is focused on the lewd speech with the amount 
of the political message that can be gleaned from the speech.  Speech 
that is more offensive on its face will need to demonstrate a higher 
level of value-added to a political issue in order to overcome the 
conclusion that it is lewd and can be banned.  If speech adds more to 
a conversation about a political issue, the standard will potentially 
 
 131  Emphasis has been added within the factors to stress the most important parts 
of each question. 
 132  Critics of this proposal would counter that this is exactly the format that such 
grassroots insurgent political movements need to gain momentum; this Comment 
argues, however, that the remoteness of such an issue in the backdrop of a United 
States school is considerable, and any potential benefit is easily overshadowed by an 
even mediocre showing of cloudiness based on lewdness in factor four.  See analysis of 
factor four, infra. 
 133  Desegregation is an example of an issue of historical significance that would 
qualify as having “news-worthy” significance and weigh in favor of admission of the 
speech under the third factor. 
 134  Genocide in other countries is an example of an issue of international 
significance that would qualify as having “news-worthy” significance and weigh in favor 
of admission of the speech under the third factor. 
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tolerate more plausibly lewd speech.  This consideration is consistent 
with the concept of not allowing students loopholes to promote, wear, 
or use lewd speech that does not provide some actual value to a 
conversation of at least arguable significance in a political context. 
ii. Does the Speech Provide Commentary on a Social Issue? 
If the proffered, plausibly lewd speech does not fit under the 
political issue subheading, the speaker will need to demonstrate that it 
plausibly comments on a social issue in order to survive a school 
district’s attempts to ban the speech under the B.H. majority’s 
standard.  Like political speech, this inquiry calls for weighing all 
factors, and the presence or lack of any one factor should not be 
dispositive.  Additionally, as with the political speech determination,135 
the presence or absence of any one of these factors is not entirely 
dispositive; speech could provide a stronger or weaker case for meeting 
or lacking one of the factors, which would affect the overall balancing 
in the analysis.  The relevant guidepost factor questions in the social 
issue determination are as follows: (1) Does the speech advocate for or 
critique a societal strength or problem?; (2) Is the speech centered on a 
topic that others in the community would know about?; (3) To what degree 
is the speech’s value clouded by its lewdness/How much of the message is 
focused on the lewd aspect of the speech vs. the inherent social value 
of the speech?136 
The most important factors in this determination are the second 
and the third.  It will be more difficult for a speaker to justify 
controversial speech that concerns a social issue that no other students 
in the school know about.  At this point, the speech is merely 
controversial because any social message is lost on the potential 
audience.  On the other hand, if the speech is on an issue that a 
speaker’s peers, or at least some of them, are aware of, any potential 
lewdness may be offset by the fact that the social message is reaching 
an audience.  Additionally, speech that has a high level of social value 
may offset potential lewdness; speech that does not provide much 
social commentary, however, will have a more difficult time offsetting 




 135  See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.  
 136  Emphasis has been added within the factors to stress the most important parts 
of each question. 
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3. Necessity of the Standard 
 Some speech could fit under both the political and social 
categories; in that event, it should be evaluated with the questions in 
both determinations.137  The speech should be allowed if it would be 
permissible under either test.  The guidepost questions are colloquial; 
this is a standard, however, that must remain applicable in the everyday 
world.  It cannot be overly rigid or formalistic or it will not remain 
relevant over any length of time.  The framework is not going to end 
all close calls in on-campus speech issues; ultimately it will be judgment 
calls by school district officials and, if litigation ensues, the skill of the 
litigators defending the districts and the students on these fact-
sensitive issues that will be decisive.  Yet the framework undeniably 
provides districts with a baseline form of evaluative inquiries that is fair 
and consistent while rightfully leaving these decisions in the hands of 
school district administrators.138 
Adopting the guideposts will ensure compliance with existing case 
precedent, guarantee that a school district official’s judgment is not 
clouded by a speech’s potential lewdness, respect the First Amendment 
rights of student speakers, and provide districts with a framework to 
document their compliance with existing case precedent in exercising 
their administrative discretion during these close calls.  The latter 
reason is the most important justification for adopting these 
guideposts and deserves elaboration. 
 
 
 137  An example of speech that may fit under both categories is speech regarding 
the Free Love Movement, which was a critique of the government’s involvement in 
affairs such as birth control and marriage that called for societal change in forms such 
as the abolishment of marriage in favor of sexual promiscuity.  See Mari Jo Buhle, People 
& Events: Free Love, PBS (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh 
/amex/goldman/peopleevents/e_freelove.html.  Speech in a school setting 
commenting on the Free Love Movement could foreseeably be plausibly lewd, and if 
so, this speech would be analyzed under factors used in both the political and the social 
issue determinations because of its ambiguous classification. 
 138  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 74, at *34 (noting that “[t]he 
Third Circuit’s importation of judicial values to govern the daily decisions of 
deportment for public school children is a major departure from First Amendment 
jurisprudential deference to local values in the public school.”), and Brief for Nat’l 
Sch. Bds. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Easton Area Sch. Dist v. 
B.H. ex rel. Hawk, No. 13-672 (filed Jan. 6, 2014), 2014 WL 69412, at *4 (noting that 
“[t]he expression [at issue in B.H.] is one example of a type of student speech that 
school officials encounter daily—sexual double-entendre intended to push 
boundaries, sometimes touching on a political or social concern.  Educators in schools 
full of impressionable students at various stages of physical, cognitive, psychological, 
sexual, emotional and social development are authorized under Fraser to make 
reasonable determinations about the appropriateness of these messages in their own 
school environments.”). 
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Currently, school districts lack a standardized format where they 
can document compliance with B.H.’s requirements for 
constitutionally banning plausibly lewd student speech.  The guidepost 
factors provide a mechanism for school districts to easily document 
their analysis to support a decision to ban or allow student speech.  
Requiring all school district officials to go through this analysis reduces 
the likelihood of an arbitrary or hasty decision that is based on the 
official’s subjective evaluation of the offensiveness of the speech.  An 
official will have to clearly articulate why speech should be banned in 
order to justify such a ban.  This more effectively safeguards the First 
Amendment rights of students, while helping the districts to avoid 
costly, potential litigation to defend their decisions down the road. 
Most of the time when these issues arise, it is unclear whether the 
speech should be allowed or banned and the speech is usually 
controversial.  The standard creates questions and gets district officials 
thinking, so that speech will be allowed whenever it possibly can be.  
The ambiguity of the words “plausibly lewd” and “plausibly interpreted 
as a political or social issue” within the Third Circuit’s endorsed 
standard demonstrates the majority’s acknowledgement that this 
standard would inevitably lead to difficult calls for school district 
officials.139  The guidepost factors provide districts with a workable 
starting point in the difficult task of defining and clarifying this 
standard. 
IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
It is helpful to attempt to apply the framework to case studies in 
order to test the effectiveness of the proposal.  The samples of analysis 
in these demonstrations will also provide a working guide for school 
districts when learning how to use the framework in the context of 
issues that arise in their own school settings. 
A. Application to B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District 
When applying the proposal to the breast cancer awareness 
bracelets in B.H., the first question to ask is if the speech is plausibly 
lewd.  Could a reasonable person plausibly consider the speech to be 
lewd, or could the speech offend a reasonable person in the 
community?  The term “boobies” does have the potential to offend 
some through its sexual connotation.  It is not so patently offensive or 
 
 139  B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, No. 13-672, 2014 WL 901854 (Mar. 10, 2014) (“Just because letting in one idea 
might invite even more difficult judgment calls about other ideas cannot justify 
suppressing speech of genuine social value.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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plainly lewd on its face that it is a clear call that the Fraser standard 
applies,140 justifying an outright ban.  Yet its lewdness is ambiguous 
enough to fall within the plausibly lewd gray area that the Third 
Circuit’s majority carved out, thereby triggering the proposed 
guidepost factors and justifying the continuance of the analysis to the 
second inquiry. 
The second step in the test is the Pickering/Garcetti overarching 
question, which considers how visitors would react to this speech and 
whether the speech could be fairly attributable to the school.  
Secondarily, this analysis also considers whether this speech would 
have a negative effect on other students in the school.  In B.H., B.H. 
and K.M. wore their bracelets, in part, during the school’s breast 
cancer awareness activities.141  The middle school had already endorsed 
October 28th as Breast Cancer Awareness Day,142 so on this particular 
day, it could be argued that the school endorsed the message or the 
bracelets themselves.  The school did not make any disclaimers, and 
the administration encouraged participation in the awareness events.143  
On other days, this argument might not be as strong.  The bracelets 
carry a positive message of breast cancer awareness in bringing this 
topic to younger generations.  Yet the sexually suggestive way that this 
message is carried out could run counter to the Easton Area School 
District or the middle school’s mission.  This argument is not as strong 
as some others, because the lewdness of the bracelet is not outright, so 
any argument of obstruction of the school’s mission is not enough to 
stop the analysis.   
There is also no evidence to suggest negative effects on the rest of 
the school that is strong enough to end the official’s analysis at this 
stage.  The district alleged two instances of disruptions within the 
school where students made remarks about “boobies,” which occurred 
after the bracelet ban.144  But the majority noted that “these two isolated 
incidents hardly bespeak a substantial disruption caused by the 
bracelets.”145  The showing of a “substantial disruption” to meet the 
Tinker test is admittedly a higher standard than what is required to 
demonstrate “negative effects on other students” in this Comment’s 
proposal.146  Yet two isolated incidents—not even directly linked to the 
 
 140  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
 141  B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 300. 
 142  Id. at 299. 
 143  Id.   
 144  Id. at 321. 
 145  Id. 
 146  See supra Part III.C.2. 
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bracelets—are not enough to demonstrate net negative effects on 
other students.147  As a result, the inquiry continues to the political or 
social issue determination.  The breast cancer awareness bracelets 
would fit into the social, not the political, category, so the school 
district official would skip to the social part of the framework to 
continue his analysis. 
The first factor provides a strong argument in favor of allowing 
the speech.  This factor asks if the speech advocates for, or critiques, a 
societal strength or problem.  The message “I • boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” certainly can be viewed as advocating for awareness of 
breast cancer, specifically in the form of encouraging women to do self 
breast exams since they are crucial to breast cancer prevention.148  The 
intention of the campaign is to promote self-awareness and a level of 
comfort in discussing previously uncomfortable issues related to breast 
health.149  The bracelets are clearly a part of this campaign, and it is 
indisputable that the campaign is advocating for awareness of the 
societal problem of breast cancer. 
The second factor also provides a strong argument in favor of 
allowing the speech.  It considers whether the speech is centered on a 
topic that others in the community would know about.  Breast cancer 
is certainly not an obscure issue.150  The search for its cure is a cause 
that has a lot of community support and promotion through various 
campaign strategies, marketing, and charity fundraising.151  Others in 
the community would be aware of such a campaign, and it is 
reasonable to think that middle school children like B.H. and K.M. 
would be aware of such issues as well, even if in a more limited capacity. 
The third factor also weighs in favor of allowing the speech; it 
considers the degree that the speech’s value is clouded by its lewdness.  
Here, there is some risk that the breast cancer campaign’s message of 
awareness will be lost on the children who are wearing and observing 
the bracelets.  The bracelets may cause some children to laugh or to 
 
 147  The Majority even notes that “the fact that these incidents did not occur until 
after the School District banned the bracelets suggests that the ban ‘exacerbated rather 
than contained the disruption in the school.’” B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 322 (citing 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 148  I LOVE BOOBIES!, supra note 104. 
 149  Id. 
 150  See What are the key statistics about breast cancer?, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/breastcancer/detailedguide/breast-cancer-key-
statistics (last modified Oct. 24, 2013) (“[In 2013, a]bout 232,340 new cases of invasive 
breast cancer will be diagnosed in women [in the United States and a]bout 39,620 
women will die from breast cancer.”). 
 151  See, e.g., SUSAN G. KOMEN, http://ww5.komen.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) 
and I LOVE BOOBIES!, supra note 104. 
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become uncomfortable, and they may become a joke instead of a 
mechanism to raise awareness, as they were originally intended.  But it 
is also undeniable that these bracelets will at least provide a forum to 
begin engaging children in conversations on these topics.  
Additionally, no real negative effect on other students within the 
school community resulted from the bracelets.152  Especially at the 
middle and high school levels, any risk of the awareness message being 
clouded by the plausible lewdness of the bracelets is lessened.  This 
may pose more of a risk with younger, elementary-aged children, but 
it does not represent a real concern at the middle school level.153  The 
positivity of the Foundation, and the overall message the bracelets aim 
to promote, outweighs the amount of lewdness at issue in this speech. 
When using the proposed guidepost factors framework, the breast 
cancer awareness bracelets at issue in B.H. should not be banned.  
Although it would be reasonable to interpret the bracelets as lewd, the 
message of breast cancer awareness is unlikely to be wholly lost on 
schoolchildren, especially middle school students.  The bracelet uses a 
somewhat controversial and attention-grabbing slogan, yet it is pretty 
clear that the bracelet is still about breast cancer awareness, due in part 
to the enormity of the awareness movement nationally.154  The Easton 
Area School District has made an effort to add a Breast Cancer 
Awareness Month observance event in its schools and has encouraged 
children to participate.155  The speech also adds value to the 
conversation about breast cancer in schools and encourages younger 
women to become active in awareness movements.  Overall, the 
benefits and non-offensive elements of the speech outweigh the 
potential negatives created by the plausible lewdness through which 
the bracelet gets its message across.  The school district should allow 
B.H. and K.M. to wear their “I • boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets 
based on the guidepost factors. 
 
 152  See supra note 147. 
 153  See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, No. 13-672, 2014 WL 901854 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that the bracelets did 
start conversations about breast cancer awareness and self-exams), but see Breast Cancer 
Fundraising Bracelets Banned from South Dakota High School, supra note 55 (noting that 
one student wore that bracelet because he found the saying humorous, not because of 
any potential breast cancer awareness message, and that some students liked the 
bracelets just because they said boobies).  If the school district had evidence of 
students’ just wearing the bracelet for a humorous purpose or just to cause controversy 
because it said boobies, as in South Dakota, this would provide a stronger argument in 
favor of justification for a ban under this third factor. 
 154  See, e.g., Komen, supra note 151. 
 155  See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 299 (“The Middle School still encouraged 
students to wear the traditional pink.”). 
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B. Application to “Screw Amabo” Political Pin Hypothetical 
One potential critique of this proposal is that it provides a 
framework that is too malleable and that any kind of plausibly lewd 
speech would weigh in favor of allowance.  A hypothetical is instructive 
to demonstrate that this is not the case.  Imagine that a fifteen-year-old 
high school student wears a political campaign button that reads 
“Screw Amabo”156 and on the back of the button in small print it says 
“Smith 2016.”  The student wears this button to school as the next 
presidential election nears.  The student argues that his speech should 
be protected under the First Amendment because it meets the criteria 
of plausibly lewd speech that comments on a political issue, and 
therefore, it cannot be banned by the school district. 
The first step is to determine if the speech is plausibly lewd: could 
a reasonable person possibly construe this speech to be lewd?157  Over 
time, the term “screw” has taken on a slang meaning,158 which has 
become increasingly sexualized.  The dictionary’s incorporation of the 
sexual definitions and emphasis on the fact that these usages are 
usually intended to be vulgar provides a strong basis for the argument 
that this term is plausibly lewd to justify the continuance of the analysis. 
The next step is to consider how visitors would react to this speech 
and whether or not the speech could be fairly attributable to the 
school, in addition to the negative effect the speech may have on other 
students in the school.  A school would not advocate one presidential 
candidate over another,159 and it is unlikely that the school would even 
be involved in an upcoming election beyond perhaps teaching 
students the background of the election process or facilitating a mock 
election.  Unless every student was wearing a button, it is unlikely that 
this message on its own could be seen as the entire school endorsing 
this political viewpoint.  The speech is also unlikely to have a negative 
effect on other students, besides potentially aggravating those who 
hold a different political view.  Without any evidence of a tangible 
 
 156  Because President Obama is ineligible to run for re-election in 2016, this pin is 
meant to refer to his successor who will run in that election, presumably an individual 
with at least moderate political notoriety. 
 157  It is helpful here to consider the possible definitions of the word “screw” as well 
as the slang meanings that the word has taken on over time.  Merriam-Webster.com 
provides nine definitions for the term screw including, “2) a screwlike form: spiral . . . 
3) a worn-out horse . . . 5) a prison guard . . . 9a) usually vulgar: an act of sexual 
intercourse, 9b) usually vulgar: a partner in sexual intercourse.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/screw (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) 
(emphasis in original). 
 158  See, e.g., Id. 
 159  A public school would not explicitly endorse one political candidate over the 
other. 
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altercation that the pin directly caused, the net negative effect 
argument is weak as well.  The answer to this inquiry weighs in favor of 
allowing the speech. 
The speech concerns a political issue, so the political factors are 
used to determine whether the speech can plausibly be seen as 
commenting on a political issue.  The first factor asks if the speech 
sides with a viewpoint in a debate.  The speech certainly takes a 
viewpoint in the presidential election; namely, an anti-Amabo 
viewpoint.  It is clear from the speech, especially the back of the button, 
that the student is supporting candidate Smith in the 2016 election.  
This factor weighs in favor of allowing the speech. 
The second factor asks whether the speech expresses satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with a politician or policy.  The pin expresses clear 
dissatisfaction with Mr. Amabo, but no references to any reasoning or 
to any of the Democratic Party’s or President Obama’s current policies 
are made.  Additionally, although the button indicates a preference 
for candidate Smith in the upcoming election, it provides no rationale, 
and this support is not plain from the face of the button because it 
cannot be seen when the button is being worn or facing upward.  This 
evidence does not provide a strong argument that the speech should 
be allowed based on any sort of argument in support of candidate 
Smith. 
The third factor asks if the speech concerns issues one could 
reasonably expect to see covered on the news.  An upcoming election 
is certainly something that would be covered on the news, so the third 
factor easily weighs in favor of allowing the speech. 
The fourth factor considers the degree to which the speech’s 
value is clouded by its lewdness.  This is the factor where the political 
pin has considerable trouble.  The button appears to take a stance on 
the upcoming presidential election, but viewers of the button cannot 
see the pro-Smith message from looking at the button when it is being 
worn or facing upward.  Additionally, the viewer learns nothing about 
the politics or practices of Mr. Amabo, his party, or his predecessor, or 
even why the speaker dislikes him, from the button itself, just that the 
wearer of the button says “Screw Amabo.”160  When the button is viewed 
as a whole, the lack of any politically supportable campaign or issue,161 
the lack of any sort of critique of Mr. Amabo, the Democratic Party, or 
President Obama, and the inappropriate sexually expletive nature of 
the message the button conveys weigh heavily in favor of giving the 
 
 160  The button appears to be nothing more than an ad hominem attack. 
 161  This excepts the back of the button, which cannot be plainly viewed. 
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school district official the right to ban the button.162  Even though this 
speech is plausibly lewd, it does not comment on any political issue 
based on the proposed framework to justify allowing the speech in a 
Third Circuit school district. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s endorsement of all obscene speech as per se 
lewd should be softened to a presumption of lewdness in order to 
conform to its ambiguous and speaker-friendly test for plausible 
lewdness.  Some obscene speech could fall within the plausibly lewd 
gray area, especially if commenting on a political or social issue, and 
the majority prematurely prevents this speech from consideration 
through its per se ban.  More crucially, the standard for judging 
plausibly lewd speech commenting on social or political issues adopted 
by the majority of the Third Circuit in B.H. v. Easton Area School District 
needs clarification and a baseline starting point of guidelines in order 
to be workable for school districts in light of evolving modes of speech 
and challenges that school district officials face on a daily basis.  The 
terms “political” and “social,” which are an integral part of the 
majority’s holding, need elaboration, or school districts will be bound 
by a standard that is far too malleable for speakers and too difficult for 
administrators to apply.  This Comment’s proposal clarifies the 
ambiguities that the Third Circuit’s current standard poses through 
providing school districts with threshold questions and a guidepost 
factors test in order to determine whether plausibly lewd speech 
comments on a political or social issue. 
In accepting this Comment’s proposal, school districts will be able 
to show the analysis they have undergone in considering whether to 
ban plausibly lewd student speech.  Even if the school district’s 
decision is not the decision a student wants, this framework makes the 
decision less arbitrary, and ideally, will allow districts to reduce the risk 
of liability when they ban plausibly lewd speech that comments on a 
political or social issue.  The framework ensures that the district is 
banning speech for the right reasons, not just because the speech 
presents a somewhat controversial or inappropriate message.  This 
analysis ensures that school district officials are valuing the First 
Amendment rights of schoolchildren, while also protecting school 
 
 162  Even though this speech may be allowable when made by a citizen in public, 
students retain somewhat limited First Amendment rights in the context of a school, 
and the facts of this situation would warrant the ban on this pin in a school context 
based on the speech’s lewdness and its failure to add any politically valuable discourse 
to a discussion. 
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districts from crushing liability in attempting to clarify, through 
unavoidable litigation, a standard that is currently overly ambiguous 
and easily manipulated. 
 
